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Abstract 
 
 This paper analyzes the explanatory power of mainstream international regime 
theories from the international political economy (IPE) literature—neoliberalism, realism, 
and cognitivism—through formal econometric techniques.  I use a data set based on 162 
dispute settlement cases since the inception of the World Trade Organization and find 
that the probability of a Dispute Settlement Panel (DSP) forming depends on the share of 
exports for a target country as a share of its total exports as well as relative gaps in 
military expenditures (as a share of GDP).  These results are highly robust to different 
model specifications and control variable choice.  Though the cognitivist variable does 
not yield significant results, this paper represents a positive first step toward more 
widespread application and confirmation of regime theories through empirical testing. 
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I. Introduction 
Disagreements over the formulation, implementation, and reg ulation of e xternal 
trade policy have increased dramatically in recent years, extending beyond the industry or 
factor cleavages predicted by standard trade models.1  Joining these interest groups have 
been ordinary citizens concerned about environmental degradation, unsatisfactory labor 
conditions and increasing incidences of illegal child labor, and the plight of developing 
countries.  As a r esult, recent tr ends in intern ational trade hav e spawned a cotta ge 
industry of pundits and commentators defending both sides of the free trade debate.2  The 
most noteworthy manifestations of this r enewed interest in tr ade have been massive 
protests against the status quo of international financial and commercial relations.  For 
example, Marxists, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and environmental activists 
continually fill city streets during World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial or 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank meetings often decrying the presence of 
these international institutions as much as the pattern of exchange that they promote. 
Mainstream academic theories about internationa l regimes and institutions posit 
that the re gularized behavior they promote reduces uncertainty, transforms zero-sum 
games into repeated versions with infinite time horizons, and lengthens the shadow of the 
future (or, equi valently, reduces a ctors’ discounting of fut ure periods of st rategic 
interaction).  In essence, the consensus among most international political economy (IPE) 
                                                 
1 See James E. Alt and Michael Gilligan, ‘The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor 
Specificity, Collective Action Problems, and Domestic Political Institutions,’ in Jeffry A. Frieden and 
David A. Lake, International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth.  Boston: 
Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2000, pp. 327-342. 
2 Such activity often has led to vociferous responses from the economics community, particularly 
from free trade defenders Jagdish Bhagwati and Paul Krugman.  See Paul Krugman, Pop Internationalism. 
Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996.  
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scholars is tha t regimes help mitigate the problems associated with achieving 
‘cooperation under anarchy.’       
Before proceeding further, a discussion of r egime definition is in order.  In this 
paper, I start with Krasner’s (1983) now widely accepted version, which casts regimes as: 
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area of i nternational relations.  Principles are beliefs of fact, 
causation, and rectitude.  Norms are s tandards of behavior defined in terms of rights and 
obligations.  Rules are specific prescriptions for action.  Dec ision-making procedures are 
prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice 
 
and consider it to be  an inadequate interpretation of institutional patterns of behavior.3  
This definition, like mos t other generalizations about regime dynamics, fails to capture 
parallel patterns of dissent and discord.  In other words, although regimes are designed 
and maintained in order to f acilitate the realization of state goals in an environment of 
conflicting preferences, cooperation or resort to regime mediation is not always observed.  
In order to e xplore further the duality of regime effects, I focus here on the  political-
economic determinants of intra-regime conflict and collaboration.   
 
II. Purpose 
The purpose of this paper is to twofold.  The primary objective is to determine the 
effects (magnitude and significance) of well-known regime theory variables on the 
probability of cooperative outcomes in international trade disputes.  In other words, what 
characteristics of countries embroiled in conflict  best ex plain state behavior during  the 
period of disagreement?  What determines whether a trade dispute is resolved bilaterally 
or through the rules and standards of a multilateral trade regime?  The second, yet no less 
important, objective is to test these theories within the context of the WTO, perhaps the 
                                                 
3 Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 1. 
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most important international trade regime today.  Wha t features of WTO member 
countries best ex plain variation in the successful use of W TO dispute settlement 
mechanisms?  Taken together, the aim of this research agenda is to analyze WTO dispute 
settlement dynamics within the context of a regime theory synthesis, the results of which 
should shed lig ht on whether the WTO dispute settlement me chanism is servin g the 
national interest of states as defined by regime theory. 
These research questions are derived from two  important mot ivating sources.  
Recent theoretical publications have offered initial hypotheses regarding the persistence 
of conflict within international regime structures and the potential for a grand synthesis of 
the major paradigms in regime theory.4  While much important qualitative work has been 
completed in this domai n, these attempts (to my  knowledge) have not included more  
rigorous applications to da ta.  Mor eover, theory building on inte rnational regimes, 
especially within the tradition of political science, tends to focus on the definitions of and 
demand for regimes.  This paper departs from previous contributions first by avoiding the 
long-standing debate on the benefits of regimes and institutions; I assume regimes to be 
collective and existence goods for international tr ade negotiators.  Second, I embrace an 
approach of examining specific regime dynamics over time and  across countries using 
econometric modeling.  Hence, this paper r epresents a fi rst cut at bridg ing the 
methodological gap dividing economists and political scientists throug h the employment 
of both economic and political variables in the econometric model.5 
                                                 
4 See Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, ‘Integrating Theories of 
International Regimes,’ Review of International Studies, Volume 26, Number 1, January 2000 for a notable 
example. 
5 Economists have in large part been engaged in model building, while political scientists prefer 
small-n case studies and qualitative theorizing. 
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In essence, this particular res earch question embodies but one of man y in the 
array of collective action/policy coordination puzzles that confront and confound 
researchers and polic y-makers.  Political econom y analyses of multilateral re gimes 
naturally focus on those variables that incre ase the probability of cooperative outcomes.  
Yet, serious empirical investigations of the viability and robustness of these predictions 
are often missing .  The  choice of a conflict ve rsus cooperation appro ach is a direct 
response to Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger (2001) and Keeley (1990), though neither 
suggests the functional form analyzed in subsequent sections.  Unfortunat ely, given the 
dearth of similar research, it will  be impossible to c ompare my findings with othe r 
hypotheses or model specifications. 
I find that the neoliberal and realist paradigms (associated with export volume and 
relative military expenditures, respectively) are significant determinants of state behavior 
within a regime-based framework, interpreting the establishment and use of a Dispute 
Settlement Panel (DSP) as a commitment to multilateral cooperation.  From the model 
estimates, it is clear that these ‘schools’ of international regime theory contain robust 
explanatory power with respect to observed behavior in the WTO.  Specifically, there is 
significant evidence supporting the claim that the neoliberal and realist paradigms are 
useful heuristic devices when analyzing patterns of trade cooperation and conflict.  
The paper is or ganized as follows.  Section III  presents a survey of the r elevant 
literature from the pe rspectives of economics and political science.  Sect ion IV briefly 
outlines the WTO dispute settlement procedure.  Se ction V de tails the data set and 
construction of the  model variables.   Section VI presents the results of the mode l 
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estimation.  Section VII concludes.  An Appendix contains summary statistics on the data 
set and all regression output.     
 
III. Literature Review 
 The existing literature on international reg imes, though well established in the  
political science community, has garnered attention from international trade theorists 
only since the advent of regional and global trade institutions.  Moreover, since the 
amount of data  required to empiricall y test a ctivity within the WTO ( or any similar 
regime) has just become available, such analyses have yet to be conducted.  On the other 
hand, political scientists have ex plored the nature of regime-based interaction, especially 
in the wake of Krasner (1983). These differing approaches and traditions are examined in 
this section through a review of the relevant literature, which will provide the necessary 
context for empirically testing international regime theories.  
Economics 
Most of the research conducted within the economics community focuses on the 
theoretical implications of international trade negotiations within the WTO.  Tr ade 
theorists, however, h ave only recently begun to address the qu estions of institutional  
design as well as the benefits of multilateralism and the dispute settlement mechanism.  
Maggi (1999) suggests a  model in which the W TO dispute settlement procedure allows 
for third-party information gathering and multilateral enforcement mechanisms.  In short, 
the WTO extends the do main of trade ne gotiations beyond strictly bilateral dimensions, 
yielding positive benefits in terms of transparency and reputational effects for offending 
countries engendered by exposing details about the complaint.  Ludema (2000) finds that 
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sanctions authorized by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) reduce trade policy 
cooperation relative to an environment without t he DSB.  Although these findings seem 
rather pessimistic, the game-theoretic model used ignores completely the information 
gathering and preference aggregating functions of the mechanism.  Bagwell and Staiger 
(1998) observe that the principles of  the G eneral Agreement on T ariffs and Trade 
(GATT), which underlie the WTO s ystem, assist g overnments in the ir effort to 
implement efficient trade agreem ents through reciprocity and nondiscrimination.  
Rosendorff (2000) portrays the dispute settlement procedure as a mechanism for reducing 
rigidity and increasing stability in trade policy.  Moreover, he finds that a wider variety of 
countries are willing to sign an agreement through a dispute settlement procedure than 
without.  Sevilla (1998) most resembles this paper’s fo cus, yet differs in its anal ysis of 
GATT versus WTO dis pute settlement procedure effectiveness.  Importantly, she f inds 
that variation in institutiona l design significantly affects state behavior in tr ade 
negotiations.  Finally, Anne O. Kreuger’s (1997) volume c asting the WTO as an  
international organization includes an early review of the dispute settlement procedure by 
legal scholar J ohn Jackson suggesting that t he dispute settlement procedure is a 
theoretically sound means of reducing the risk premium on international trade. 
International Political Economy/Political Science 
Neoliberal Theories 
The dominant paradigm in international regime theory has been termed neoliberal 
because of its emphasis  on s ystemic convergence of inter ests.6  Not sur prisingly, the 
neoliberal approach is biased toward explanations of cooperation or the conditions under 
                                                 
6 The international relations (IR) conception of neoliberalism is similarly a systemic view of 
cooperation among states due to shared economic interests. 
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which cooperation may arise.  Theo ries from this perspective borrow heavily from 
microeconomic concepts of information asymmetries, transaction costs, and game 
theoretic behavior. Keohane (1984), fo r example, underscores the deman d for re gimes 
arising from these mic roeconomic deficiencies.  As is well known, man y trade dispute 
scenarios in the absence of formal or informal institutions can be reduced to a game of 
one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma in which the suboptimal outcome of ‘mutual defection’ is a  
Nash equilibrium of th e normal form game.  Regimes, argue neoliberal theorists, 
transform international economic relations into t he equivalent of dynamic games with 
infinite time horizons.  With sufficiently low discount rates on future sta ges of play, the 
cooperative solution ma y emerge from strate gies of Tit-for-Tat  (player selects 
counterpart’s previous strategy in the nex t stage) or Grim Trigg er (both players choose 
the cooperative strat egy until one pla yer defects; then second pla yer defects fo r the 
remainder of play).7  B riefly stated, regimes raise the costs associate d with non-
compliance in any particular situation, and, consequently, make cooperation more likely.8  
Other prominent ideas from the neoliberal pa radigm include Ru ggie’s (1983) 
exposition of ‘embedded liberalism.’  Because of the often-disproportionate distributional 
effects of trade polic y for various factors of pro duction—namely those t hat control the  
use and flows of income to capital and labor—re gimes allow governments to adopt trade 
policies as long as they simultaneously provide social safety nets.  Embedded liberalism 
effectively reflects a particular government’s commitment to remunerating dislocated or 
disadvantaged sectors facing competitive pressures under free trade.  
                                                 
7 See Robert Gibbons, Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1992, p. 91 and Kenneth A. Oye (ed.), Cooperation Under Anarchy. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1986, pp. 50-51. 
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At the heart of these an d other neoliberal theori es is the proposition  that trade  
matters to sta tes in te rms of both r eal income and increased consumption se ts to the 
extent that sustaining mutually beneficial patterns of trade will impel disputants to reduce 
or eliminate the potential for conflict.  More over, there is a n implicit assumption in 
neoliberal thought that states behave ac cording to ax ioms of economic rationalit y.  In 
other words, Country X will prefer higher levels of income made possible thoug h trade 
and, through instrumental reasoning , elects the proper trade polic y for achieving these 
and other s elf-interested goals.  It is important  to note that the neolib eral ‘ontology’ 
assumes that states are primarily concerned with absolute gains from trade, thereby 
framing economic transactions in a  positive-sum game framework.  Consequently, 
countries have a vested interest in preserving  regime structures onc e they are formed, 
ensuring that at some l evel those structures are robust to shifts in wealth or cap abilities 
within the international system.    
Realist Theories 
Realist theories of regimes share the same fundamental assumptions of rationality 
and self-interested behavior that have char acterized the neoliberal par adigm.  The poin t 
of departure lies in the underlying motivation for re gime formation and the probabilit y 
that regimes will survive shocks to  distributions of e conomic or military power.  
Specifically, relative gains often matter and cause regime dynamics to br eak down o r 
disappear all together.  According to this log ic, states onl y will support and maintain 
regimes as lon g as it is in their immediate intere st to do so.  F urthermore, without the  
presence of a dominant hegemon to coerce acceptance and enforce the ‘rules of the game’ 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.35. 
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as well as to ‘tax ’ potential free ride rs, regimes will cease to function or demand  
attention.9  Thus, realist states heavily discount future stages of pla y in the international 
trade game.  In a self-help environment, countries are concerned about the distributions  
of goods, technology, and arms among  both a llies and adversa ries that result from  
relatively free patterns of trade. 
Grieco (1993) acknowledges the appeal of the ne oliberal viewpoint, including its 
common use of 2x2 Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) games as structural models and its faith in 
iterated reciprocal strategies based on Axelrod’s (1984) seminal study.  Yet, he concludes 
that ‘conditional cooperation among states may evolve in the  face of international 
anarchy and mixed interests through strategies of reciprocity, extended time horizons, 
and reduced ve rification and sanctioning  costs [emphasis added] .’10  The thrust of his 
argument is that re gimes cannot guarantee the emergence of cooperation.  At the end of 
the day, regimes fail to allay the fear of distributional advantages accruing to political or 
economic adversaries.  Grieco thus demonstrates the fundamental difference between his 
interpretation and the neoliberal case through the following neoliberal and realist utility 
functions, respectively: 
                                                      Ui = Vi; Ui = Vi - k(Wj – Vi)                                                  (1) 
where Ui = utility of state i; Vi = payoff to state i, Wj = payoff to state j≠i, and k = coefficient of 
sensitivity 
 
                                                 
9 See Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1981 and John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions,’ International Security, 
Volume 19, Number 3, Winter 1994/95. 
10 David A. Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1993, p. 122.   
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The coefficient of sensitivity k in Equation 1 measures a state’s responsiveness to relative 
gains, or the difference in payoffs accruing to the two states.11  Grieco claims that k may 
vary from state to state and from system to system, but the coefficient will always remain 
greater than zero.  In other words, for a state operating under realist assumptions, relative 
gains will always matter.  Even exchanges with a llies are affected by the k coefficient; 
‘gaps in pay offs favoring partners will a lways detract from a state’s utility to some  
degree.’12  
How well does Grie co’s position, and b y extension that of realist re gime theory, 
depict the reality of interstate efforts toward cooperation?  If his a rgument that states 
always are mindful of r elative gains is valid, th en cooperation is ex tremely unlikely or 
even impossible with political and economic ri vals or when tr ade agreements entail 
uneven distributions.  Nevertheless, cooperative behavior among allies and adversaries is 
an observable phenomenon.  In fact, turning Grieco’s criticism of conditional cooperation 
on its head, the v alue of k is similarly dependent on a set o f conditions: the number o f 
actors, N, engaged in international trade and the pa yoff structure described by the 
appropriate game theoretic framework.  Sta ted otherwise, calculations of r elative gains 
will be most sig nificant and influential when trade approximates a zero-sum game of 
Deadlock and as N → 2.13  Apart from the height of the Cold War era, it i s difficult to 
identify a peri od that reflects these conditions of extreme bipolarity and irreconcilable 
trading positions.  As a  result, the conditions that elevate relative gains considerations 
appear to be extreme, limiting cases that fail to capture the common experience of states.  
                                                 
11 k is assumed to be zero whenever (Wj – Vi) ≤ 0.  This makes intuitive sense, since the restriction 
implies the absence of any positive relative gains accruing to the second state. 
12 Ibid, p. 129.  
 
 
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje 
14 
In a multipolar world marked by malleable interests and opportunities for 
accommodation, most si tuations will fall somew here along a continuum running from 
complete cooperation (Harmony) to intractable conflict (Deadlock).  
Cognitivist Theories 
A third branch of international re gime theory abandons the assumption of  
explicitly rational decision-making  according to ex ogenously given preferences.  The  
cognitive or constructivist paradigm focuses on the role of uncertainty in the international 
economic system and the potential fo r knowledge and information to sh ape the way in 
which states interact.  H asenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger (2000) divide this approach  
into weak and st rong variants.  The form er refers to processes of l earning among state 
actors, bounded r ationality, and other cognitive limitations.  F or example, knowledge 
about a hi gh technology product imported from Japan or a n ew agricultural chemical 
introduced on American  farms ma y be unavailable or indecipherable to those charged  
with resolving disputes.  Thus, we ak cognitivists stress the ‘demand on the part of 
decision-makers for reliable issue-specific knowledge.’14  Studies of so-called epistemic 
communities have shed  light on this ph enomenon and the  role o f information in the  
complex process of policy coordination.15  Strong cognitivist theories, on the other hand, 
are less explanatory theories than approaches to analyzing interstate behavior.  W endt 
(1992) is a notable example.  Among other arguments, Wendt avers that ‘through practice 
agents are continually producing and reproducing identities and interests, continuously 
                                                                                                                                                 
13 See Duncan Snidal, ‘Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation,’ in Baldwin 
(1993).   
14 Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger (2000), p. 10. 
15 A prominent example is Peter M. Haas, ‘Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and 
Mediterranean Pollution Control,’ International Organization, Volume 43, 1989. 
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choosing now the preferences [they] will have la ter.’16  In a sense, international affairs 
are characterized by a constant state of flux among chosen identities and interests, 
thereby denying the rationalist assumptions of neoliberalism and realism.  
One major deficiency in the cognitivist approach is its general lack of predictive 
power.  Such explanations, by nature, tend to abstract from the nuances of reality.  Where 
they fall short as forecasting tools, however, cognitivist ideas portraying institutions as 
organic social constructions are p articularly useful explanatory variables. This paper in 
part attempts to extract predictive power from the cognitivist paradigm by applying its 
central themes to specific institutional features of the WTO.   
The Possibility of Theoretical Synthesis 
Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger (2000) accentuate the compatibilit y of 
neoliberal and realist regime theories based on the common und erlying assumption of  
rationality.  Following Keohane (1984), I take rationality to imply 
 
that actors have consistent, ordered preferences, and that they calculate costs and benefits of 
alternative courses of action in order to maximize their utility in view of those preferences.17  
 
Indeed, the attractiveness of Keohan e’s argument in After Hegemony lies the use of 
traditionally realist theoretical assumptions in a  primarily neoliberal argument.  This 
congruity should be neither controve rsial nor surprising .  For, if both theories presume  
that states value either increased trade flows or political security, then there must be  a 
                                                 
16 Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics,’ International Organization, Volume 46, Number 2, Spring 1992, p. 411. 
17 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 27. 
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method of expressing these values as preferences associated with state behavior.18  Thus, 
an empirical test includi ng measures of these p references should hav e the potential to 
reveal the joint significance of neoliberal and realist theories.   
 Cognitivist theories, on t he other hand, are not grounded in explicit assumptions 
of rationality.  In fact, the strong version represents a rejection of rationa lity in favor of 
social construction.  Oft en borrowing from soci ological theories, arguments from this  
perspective deny that preferences are exogenously given according to the vagaries of 
international trade, exchange flows, or arms sales.  Co gnitivist theories by definition 
attempt to uncover the endogenous determinants of state behavior—those conditions and  
distributions of knowledge that shape and, in turn, are shaped by international actors.   
Given this sufficient basis for a  synthesis of neoliberal, realist, and weak 
cognitivist regime theories, I proceed to the empirical portion of the paper.    
 
IV. Dispute Settlement in the WTO19 
First, it will be helpful to review the fundamentals of dispute settlement 
procedures in the WTO.  As part of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations under the 
GATT, rules and procedures for handling dispute resolution within the WTO framework 
were conceived in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement 
of Disputes.  One of the highlights of the revised system was a method of preventing any 
one Member from disrupting dispute resolution.  Whereas under the GATT, states could 
                                                 
18 One potential criticism, however, may be that construing states as unitary rational actors with 
well-ordered preferences is wholly inappropriate.  For the purposes of this paper, we assume this to be a 
sufficient characterization despite the validity of bureaucratic politics models. 
19 This section is largely based on a summary in Konstantinos Adamantopoulos (ed.), An Anatomy 
of the World Trade Organization. London: Klumer Law International, 1997. 
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unilaterally block complaints, the WTO Dispute Settlement mechanism requires a 
consensus among disputant(s) and target in order to block the formation of a panel. 
A dispute may never reach panel review fo r several reasons.  F irst, for a case of 
special importance such as t he US-Japanese car import dispute (DS6) or the EU-US 
conflict over the us e of the hormones  estradiol and testosteron e in th e cattle industr y 
(DS26), the Dir ector-General may become personally involved in  dispute resolution,  
bypassing the panel process entirely.  If neither the Director-General nor the disputants 
themselves can rea ch an agreem ent, the matter then becomes eligible for DS P 
intervention.  Alternativel y, the economic sig nificance of a disa greement may not be 
sufficient for the establishment of a DSP.     
If a DSP conven es, its membership (ran ging from three to five individuals) will 
investigate the details of  the case and present a f ormal analysis with suggestions for the  
proper course of conflict resolution.  In order to facilitate the investigation, the panel may 
convoke an Expert Review Group.  These bodies are analogous to epistemic communities 
in that their members are qualified experts in the field of inquiry relevant to the case.  The 
ERG is solel y an advisory organization and its r eports are distributed to the disputants 
and to the DSP for review and comments. 
Panel decisions quite often fail to sa tisfy both parties.  When disagreement 
persists, the case may be brought before an appellate body, the decision of which is final 
and binding (provided  the DSB ele cts to adopt  the rep ort). Figure 1 in  the Appendix 
depicts the various stages of dispute  settlement according to these provisions.  Node s 
without subsequent panels are either second ary options from the preceding panel or 
possibly intermediary steps between panels. 
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These factors, however, only suggest explanations for institutional solutions to 
conflict as a  function o f the DSB bure aucratic process, wh ereas this paper seeks to 
identify theoretical factors that might also induce states to submit to  the decisions of 
supranational arbiters.    
 
V. Data and Hypotheses 
Theories of re gime-based trade policy examined in Section III may be 
summarized according to the ex planatory variables outlined in Chart 1 .  This se ction 
describes how these theories are translated into falsifiable hypotheses with the use of  
economic data.  The v ariables outlined below, though borrowed from regime theory, are 
not associated with or based on an y previous econometric modeling.  I therefore devote 
significant discussion to the rationale behind each variable construction and place those 
specifications within the c ontext of the regime theories they are intended to r epresent.  
Appropriate summary statistics are docum ented in Tables 1 and 2  of the Appendix and 
are discussed in the concluding section. 
 
    CHART 1 - MAINSTREAM REGIME THEORY EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
 
 
Neoliberal 
 
 
Realist 
 
Cognitivist 
 
Constellations of 
Interest 
(usually trade 
flows) 
 
 
 
Power 
 
Knowledge or 
Information 
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Case Selection 
 
Of the 254 cases registered with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body at the time of 
writing, only 75 (30%) have prompted the formation of a DSP.  The data set includes 162 
of the total cases from DS1 to DS202,  since no subsequent cases wer e examined by a 
DSP.  Of those, 56 (35%) are identified as panel cases, excluding observations for which 
data was unavailable or that were extensions of previous cases.  Moreover, for cases in 
which more than country is listed as a disputant, the first country to register the complaint 
is listed as the disputant.  As the Appendix summary statistics exhibit, a disproportionate 
number of cases involve either  the EU  or t he US.  Potential bias  is avoided b y 
constructing an EU-US dummy, which is described below.   
Dependent Variable 
The intensity of conflict in a W TO dispute and its effect on state  behavior are 
difficult concepts to capture, both in qua litative and quantitative terms.  A few potential 
candidates for the depen dent variable are: the monetar y value of sanctions imposed in a 
settlement package, the length (in days) of a dispute as recorded by the DSB, or the 
probability that any potential trade conflict is for mally brought to the attention of the 
WTO.  Yet, because monetary sanctions have been imposed in only three cases to date20; 
the length of a dispute may be a function more of bureaucratic inefficiency than inherent 
conflict; and calculatin g the probabilit y measure requires knowled ge of undocumented 
disagreements, these formulations are ruled out.  Though not a perfect proxy for conflict 
intensity, I have chosen the probability that a case will a ppear before a DSP a s the 
                                                 
20 Rodney D. Ludema, ‘Optimal International Trade Agreements and Dispute Settlement 
Procedures,’ European Journal of Political Economy, July 2000. 
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dependent variable, expressed as the dummy Pn.21  The pr imary benefit of this 
formulation, however, i s that it captures disputants’ willing ness to pur sue resolution 
through the formal apparatuses of the WTO and thus the extent to which conflict matters 
in a trade issue area or requires third party review and consultation. 
   As discussed in Section IV, bureaucratic or organizational factors may affect the 
probability that a case garners the attention of a  DSP.  Ne vertheless, more nuanced 
explanations derived fro m regime theory also sh ould underlie this proba bility function.  
The models estimated in the  following section are designed to te st the significance of 
standard IPE theories as determinants of DSP formation.   
 Independent Variables 
Bilateral Exports as a Share of Total Export Volume 
At the heart of neoclassical trade theory is the Ricardian notion of specialization 
and trade according to comparative advantage augmented with the Hecksher-Ohlin and 
Stolper-Samuelson models.  Althoug h patterns of trade may emerge among countries 
regardless of factor endo wments or within (rather  than across) industries, standard trade  
theory posits economic gains for exporters and (under certain restrictions) welfare gains 
for consumers.  T rade increases income and consumption sets, thereby releasing 
populations from the strictures of producing and purchasing all goods domestically.   
Consequently, one would expect that countries, especially those that have opted to 
abide by the trade rules and standards of the WTO have a common interest in maintaining 
high volumes of trade as predicted by neoliberal theories.  Simply stated, when a country 
is a significant stakeholder in trade and faces the possibility of suspended trade relations 
on account of a bur geoning dispute, it will atte mpt to ma ximize its utility function by 
                                                 
21 The dummy takes the values 1 if a panel is established and 0 if not. 
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reducing the intensit y of conflict.  F rom a game-theor etic standpoint, the dispute  
settlement procedure effectively casts a longer shadow of the future onto current stages of 
play.   
The neoliberal variable Tn is constructed as 
i
ji
EX
EX → , where the numerator is the 
volume of ex ports from the target country to th e disputant (in millions of constant US  
dollars) as a sha re of t he target’s total exports.22  All d ata are taken from the IMF 
Direction of Trade Statistics (1995-2000), which are published on a quarterly basis.23  As 
a result, the values used are those for the quarter in which the dispute was lodged with the 
DSB.  B ased on ne oliberal and standard international trade theory, I hypothesize the 
following with respect to the trade flows variable: 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Greater values for bilateral exports as a share of total exports for 
a target country increase the probability that a DSP will be established. 
Military Expenditures  
Realist regime theory invariably focuses on the role of power relations among 
states.  These paradi gms define international ec onomic relations in terms of fung ible 
capabilities and resources, i.e. assets available to a state that are easily transferable into 
political clout.  As Gr ieco’s simple model indicates, relative power considerations may 
translate into stalled or severed economic relations.   
Data with respect to relative gains on a significant scale and across a wide variety 
of countries is impossibl e to obtain.  Hence, I construct a proxy for the realist paradigm 
                                                 
22 One could argue that a more precise indicator for the neoliberal variable would be the 
importance of trade in the disputed sector or industry for the target country measured as the sector-specific 
share of total exports.  Due to data limitations, the total volume of exports to the disputant country is a 
sufficient alternative.   
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that makes use of militar y expenditure as a pe rcentage of GDP for the countries in the 
data set.  In order to ca pture the spirit of relative gains considerations, I use Mn = 
i
i
j
j
GDP
MIL
GDP
MIL
−1  in order to capture differences in relative military expenditures from 
equality.  This construction, according to realist theory, is related to (though not perfectly 
correlated with) the probability of a DSP forming due to the tendency of military rivals to 
eschew regime-based solutions to trade disputes.24  Dat a for t his variable are de rived 
from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (2001) Yearbook of World 
Armaments and Disarmament.25   
Thus, a model of disput e settlement should take into account considerat ions of 
power balances using this proxy of milita ry expenditures.  In keeping with realist 
predictions about regime-based interactions, I claim:   
HYPOTHESIS 2: Greater differences in relative military expenditure between the 
countries involved in a dispute increase the probability that a DSP will be 
established.   
Cognitive Dummy 
Representing knowledge in the spirit o f cognitivist theory and as a quantitative 
regressor is a ne arly impossible task.  I therefore make use of th e dummy variable, Cn, 
which takes a value of 1 if the dispu ted product comes from a hig h-technology sector 
                                                                                                                                                 
23 Data for the EU-15 are neither averages nor aggregates across Member States.  The DTS 
Yearbooks have published figures for the European Union from 1995 to the present. 
24 Though this is the primary variable construction used, we also include model specifications with 
expenditure shares countries entered as individual variables. 
25 Like the DTS formulation, the SIPRIS Yearbook calculates data on military expenditures for the 
EU-15, though not as shares of GDP.  Therefore, the EU figures are divided by EU GDP, taken as an 
aggregate across Member States according to World Development Indicators (1999).  
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(e.g. computer equipment or satellite navigation systems), chemical or pharmaceutical 
sectors, or agricultural sectors and 0 otherwise.  The rationale for this specification with 
respect to the  first two c ategories is str aightforward.26  It is hig hly probable that trade 
disputes in those sector s will require some amount of specializ ed knowledge in the 
process of the investig ation—knowledge that w ill not necessarily be co ntained in the  
general information sets of DSP members.  Henc e if unique knowledge a nd information 
are important elements in a  case, weak cognitive theory suggests that the disputants 
would seek the counsel of an ERG.  For example, in agricultural disputes concerning the 
safety of food engineered with biotechnolo gical science, an ERG ma y provide the 
external, relatively unbiased analysis necessary to reach a scientific consensus.            
To be sure, Cn is not a  perfect portrayal of the cognitivist paradigm at work.  A 
more plausible formulation would account for the actual presence of an ERG.  Since the 
formation of an ERG is dependent on the establishment of a DSP, endogeneity problems 
prevent the use of such an indicator.  A more direct test of the cognitive paradigm alone 
might take the form of a  model testing the hypothesis that the presence of an ERG 
expedites the panel d eliberation process and publication of the DSP’s official r eport.  
Nevertheless, use of Cn in the probability model leads to the following hypothesis:  
HYPOTHESIS 3: Cases in which scientific or technical knowledge is integral to the 
dispute resolution or in which agricultural interests are at stake increase the 
probability that a DSP will be established. 
                                                 
26 I include agricultural cases because of the high incidence of intense conflict in this sector.  
Aside from the now infamous European banana regime dispute (beginning with DS27) and the beef 
hormones case, work experience at the US Department of Agriculture Food Safety and Inspection Service 
(FSIS) suggests that other agricultural cases might have similar ramifications for the dispute settlement 
procedure.  Indeed, one of the primary roles of the FSIS and the Under Secretary overseeing the 
administration is coordination with international regimes, including the World Health Organization and 
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Relative Per Capita GDP Ratios 
The first control variable makes use of data on per capita GDP for the countries 
involved in each dispute.  Fig ures are taken from World Development Indicators (1999).  
Constructed as 
i
j
GDP
GDP
−1 , the variable Yn captures the notion tha t imbalances in 
economic size will impact the decision of a country or countries to enter into a formal 
dispute settlement scheme.  Presumabl y, disparities in economic si ze between countries 
translate into ca lculations of the dispute’s relative economic importance, at least with 
respect to the we althier country.27  Countries with hig her income levels may find it less  
worthwhile to engage in the  formal mechanisms of the dispute settlement process with 
developing countries, especially if the disputant s can agree to side p ayments or othe r 
concessions.  For example, it is unlikel y that a case involving the Slovak  Republic and 
the US would appear be fore a DSP, since the ‘senior partner ’ (the US) would prefer to  
settle the matter outside of the WTO f ramework given the large number of  concurrent 
pending cases. 
Accordingly, I posit the following hypothesis:     
HYPOTHESIS 4: Greater disparities in GDP levels between disputant and target 
increase the probability that a DSP will be established. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Codex Alimentarius Commission, and other countries to resolve trade disputes in accordance with WTO 
rules and standards. 
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EU-US Dummy 
The European Union is listed as part y to a dispute in 67 cases (41%) and the  
United States in 91 cases (56%); 28 cases (17%) i nclude both major players. Indeed, one 
criticism of this data set may imply that the inclusion of these cases automatically biases 
the results toward these observations.  Consequently, either country’s presence may be of 
interest as a control variable and ma y explain a sig nificant portion of t he variation in 
panel formation.  In various specifications of the regression model, I include the dummies 
EUn and USn. 
In order to re main consistent with pr evious hypotheses, it se ems likely that the 
joint presence of the EU and US in a dispute case should reduce the probability of a DSP 
forming.  Intuitively, the EU and US have much  to lose  economically from prolonged 
conflict and are seldom conscious of military competitiveness, which, when considered 
together, should yield more frequent submissions to a panel.  Thus, I postulate:   
HYPOTHESIS 5: The presence of the EU or the US as parties to a dispute 
increases the probability that a DSP will be established. 
Democratic Index  
The final control va riable, Dn, measures the relationship between the de gree of 
political freedom and respect for democratic principles in disputing countries and the use 
of DSPs.  Co mmitment to civil liberties i s ostensibly, though not necessarily, linked to  
transparent political processes and faith in pol itical institutions a s intermediaries in 
society.  Consequentl y, one may expect to find that more democratic co untries submit 
their case to DSPs than  do more  authoritarian regimes.  Undoubtedly, any index of 
                                                                                                                                                 
27 This is assumed to be true irrespective of economic interdependence through trade.  In any 
event, it is unlikely that non-neighboring states with significant per capita GDP disparities will have large 
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democratic freedom will be subject to the particular questions deemed important by the 
organization conducting the survey. 
The index used in this  analysis is taken f rom the 2001-2002 version  of the 
Freedom House Global Survey of Freedom.  The data included are indices  measuring the 
status of political rig hts and civil liberties in a p articular country ranging from 1 (most  
identifiable with democratic ideals) to 7 ( least identifiable with democratic ideals).  In 
each model, Dn for a g iven country is alwa ys calculated as the aver age of the polit ical 
rights and civil liberties indices.  However, some model specifications include Dn as the 
average index values fo r the two countries co mbined.  EU values we re obtained b y 
averaging individual Dn values for the 15 Member States.28  Briefly stated, I claim: 
HYPOTHESIS 6: The presence of relatively more democratic countries as parties 
to a dispute increases the probability that a DSP will be established.   
 
VI. Model Estimation 
The baseline model esti mates in this section were obtained throu gh an ordinary 
least squares (OLS) estimation of the linear probability model given by: 
 
                           Pn  = α0 + α1*Tn + α2*Mn + α3*Cn + εn                                        (2) 
 
where the εn are serially uncorrelated error terms with mean zero.  The LPM invariably 
entails heteroskedasticity in the error terms, which is corrected using White’s technique.  
Estimation of this simple  model yielded the conclusion that trade flows and relative 
military expenditures are significantly correlated with the probability of DSP formation.  
                                                                                                                                                 
bilateral trade balances. 
28 Index values from 1995 to 2000 are constant for all 15 countries, with most assigned the ideal 
value of 1 for both indicators.  Inclusion of Italy causes the average value to increase slightly to 1.2. 
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Tables 3 and  4 pres ent the regression output, with significance determined at the 5% 
level.  While  the cognitive dummy Cn was not sig nificant in this spe cification, the 
positive sign does fit with the prediction of Hypothesis 3.  The  signs and significance of 
Tn and Mn are consistent with H ypotheses 1 and 2, respectively.  Interpretations of LPM 
estimates differ slightly from traditional OLS techniques; coefficient estimates represent 
the probability increase or decrease of observing a dependent variable ‘win’ (in this case, 
Pn = 1) for a unit change in the independ ent variable.  Therefore, I conclude from this  
model that a unit increase in export shares for a target country increases the probability of 
a DSP f orming by 31%, while a unit incr ease in re lative military expenditure gaps 
decreases the same probability by approximately 7%.  Note the R2 for this estimation is 
rather low at 0.04.  Nonetheless, R2 is a somewhat dubious measure of goodness of fit in 
LPM estimations.29  
 Included in Table 1 are four additional specifications of the model, each retaining 
the three regime theory indicators and ad ding different combinations of the control  
variables from the pr eceding section.  Model 2  replaces Mn with the  simple ratio of 
military expenditures (disputant relative to target).  This indic ator is also significant and 
has virtually the same effect.  None theless, I retain Mn in all subsequent estimations.  
Model 3 adds the EU and US dummies, which are both highly insignificant.  Mode l 4 
includes the democratic indices and obtains similar insignificant results.  Finally Model 5 
controls for Yn and, again, the bas eline results are unchanged.  Thus, Model 1 results for 
Tn and Mn are gener ally robust to different f unctional forms; that is  they remain 
significant and retain their original signs. 
                                                 
29 Values between 0.2 and 0.6 are typically regarded as strong indicators of explanatory power.  
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 Table 2 pr esents two additional models that make use o f non-standard 
representations of Hypotheses 4 and 6.  As expected, Tn and Mn remain significant, while 
the null hypotheses that the control variables are zero are not rejected.  Interestingly, 
however, the highest R2 (0.06) is obtained in non-standard Model 2.    
Finally, I revisit the three primary hypotheses and the implic ations of these 
findings for international regime theory. 
  
VII. Conclusion 
Clearly, the p receding econometric analysis lends support to a synthesis of 
neoliberal and realist regime theories as determinants of state behavior in the  WTO.  
Given that coeffi cients on both Tn and Mn were consistently significant, one could 
interpret this fact as evidence of their joint theoretical utility.  If we accept the rationalist 
premises of neoliberalism and realism, then this result is not entirely surprising.  For, the 
estimations undertaken were bas ed on data that directl y captures the economic and  
political interests of the  countries involved—int erests that appear to affect the way in 
which they conduct negotiations and dispute settlement.    
 Glancing at the summa ry statistics, we can conclude the following about country 
characteristics in the WTO dispute settlement process and the role of this mechanism in 
achieving state goals from a rationalist perspecti ve.  Export shares for tar geted countries 
tend to be non-trivial; the mean value for the Tn variable is nearly 15%.  With such high 
trade volumes at stake, the significance of Tn seems even more natural.  Interestingly, 
most countries ac counted for in DSB cases are exceptionally democratic.  The  mean 
values for both disputants and tar gets are slightly above the ideal value of 1.  Certainl y, 
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this is affected by the disproportionate number of cases involving the EU and US; but, it 
may also point to the fact that the WTO and other multilateral regimes tend, on average, 
to attract more democratic states.   
What might explain the uniform insignificance of the cognitive variable?  As  
noted in Section IV, the cognitive variable is certainly an imperfect proxy for the role of 
epistemic communities or technical information gathering institutions.  Moreover, the 
results may have been biased by the inclusion of agricultural cases in va riable 
construction, which, ha d they been left out, would have prohibitively  reduced the 
variance of Cn.  The i nsignificance of Cn of course does not inva lidate the cognitivist 
research agenda.  To be sure, with improvement s in science and technolog y has come  
serious disagreement about the validit y of conflicting evidence for and against various 
forms of technology in consumer-based economies.  Additional steps sho uld be taken to 
codify and capture the essence of the cognitivist approach for future empirical analyses.   
 Other fruitful extensions of this resear ch might include consideration of regional 
trade regimes or additional multilateral institutions whose missions a re located at the 
nexus of international po litics and economics.   Building upon Sevilla (1998), one could 
test these hypotheses against the combined GATT/WTO data set used in that paper.  As 
these considerations are beyond the scope of this paper, I leave their exploration to the 
reader. 
The implications of this pa per are clear.  Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger’s 
call for a theoretical synthesis indeed has merit a nd should be pursued fur ther with other 
data sets and samples.  Hopefully, this will le ad to a  revival of international regime 
theory and spawn more research programs that make use of t raditionally economic tools.  
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More important for policy purposes, though, my findings seem to indicate that  the 
institutional design of the embattled WTO in fa ct conforms to the  interests of states as 
defined by standard regime theory.  To wit, the dispute settlement mechanism embedded 
in its framework  maintains an ideal amount of f lexibility for states seeking to r esolve 
trade conflict issues.  For countries with high stakes in trade, DSPs tend to be established 
in order to expedite the settlement process.  For countries concerned about relative gains, 
establishment of DSP b ecomes a less likely outcome, reflecting a general disdain for 
regime-based solutions.  Consequentl y, the nex t logical question that s ocial activists, 
commentators, and trade theorists should attempt to answer  is not whether to abolish the  
WTO but how  to strengthen further its r ole in reducing conflict in th e international 
political economy. 
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Appendix 
 
FIGURE 1 – THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE 
Source: Adamantopoulos (ed.), Anatomy of the World Trade Organization, 1997. 
 
Figure not available.  
 
 
 
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje 
32 
TABLE 1 – SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT DATA SET 
Source: World Trade Organization, 2002 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm>. 
Total number of observations: 162 
 
CATEGORY                     NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS         PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL 
 
Panel cases    56    35% 
United States (US) cases   91    56% 
European Union (EU) cases  67    41%  
US and EU cases    28    17% 
Developing Country cases   79    49% 
Technical or Agricultural cases  54    33%    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 – SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR SELECTED INDEPENDENT VARIABLES  
(ALL VALUES IN MILLIONS OF US DOLLARS, EXCEPT FOR DEMOCRATIC INDEXES) 
 
SERIES  MEAN (µ)    MEDIAN     MAXIMUM    MINIMUM     STANDARD DEVIATION (σ) 
 
Tn       0.15           0.09           0.88            0.00019                   0.17 
 
Mn                          0.72            0.43           8.4                  0                             1 
 
Dn (disputant)     1.66             1.2              7                    1                          1.15  
 
Dn (target)          1.89             1.2              6                    1                          1.11 
 
Yn                               21931.9        26517       44987.6          380.07                  11453.1 
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TABLE 3 – REGRESSION OUTPUT (STANDARD CASE) 
 
Dependent variable: Dummy variable (Pn): 1 if DSP established, 0 otherwise 
Model Number          (1)                  (2)                  (3)                  (4)                  (5)    
Observations             162                162                 162                 162                162 
Countries                   48                   48                   48                   48                  48 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Constant      0.31  0.34        0.32                0.29               0.31 
                                (5.20)               (5.27)           (3.89)             (2.58)             (5.20) 
 
Tn      0.51  0.53               0.52               0.65                0.54 
      (2.41)              (2.45)            (2.46)             (3.11)             (2.55) 
 
Mn     -0.07                                     -0.08               -0.06         -0.07 
                               (-2.78)                                  (-3.14)            (-2.55)            (-2.74) 
 
Cn                0.03                 0.04              0.02                0.04                0.03 
     (0.40)               (0.46)           (0.30)              (0.47)             (0.43) 
 
Milc/Milt                                   -0.06 
                            (-2.74) 
 
Yn                                                                                                                -0.001 
                                                                                                                        (-0.50) 
 
EUn                                                           -0.06 
                                                                            (-0.79) 
 
USn                                                             0.04 
                                                                             (0.56) 
 
Dn (disputant)                                                                               0.04 
                                                                                                    (1.25) 
 
Dn (target)                                                                                   -0.03 
                                                                                                   (-0.89) 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
R2                       0.04                 0.04               0.04                  0.05              0.04 
Note: White-corrected t-statistics given in parentheses.  All regressions are OLS estimates of a linear 
probability model. 
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TABLE 4 – REGRESSION OUTPUT (NON-STANDARD CASE) 
 
Dependent variable: Dummy variable (Pn): 1 if DSP established, 0 otherwise 
Model Number                        (1)                                        (2)  
Observations                          162                                       162                 
Countries                                 48                                         48                
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Constant                                0.28                                      0.32 
                                             (2.72)                                    (3.01) 
 
Tn                                     0.53                                      0.66 
                                             (2.45)                                   (3.09) 
 
Mn                                 -0.07                                     -0.06 
                                           (-2.72)                                   (-2.34) 
 
Cn                                  0.05   ,                                   0.02 
                                            (0.56)                                    (0.22) 
 
Yn (disputant)                                                                -4.64 x 10-6 
                                                                                          (-1.27) 
 
Yn (target)                                                                      3.95 x 10-6 
                                                                                          (1.34) 
 
Dn (average)                         0.01 
                                            (0.21) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
R2                                  0.04                                        0.06          
Note: White-corrected t-statistics given in parentheses.  All regressions are OLS estimates of a linear 
probability model. 
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